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Financial contracts and contingent control rights




According to empirical studies of venture capital finance, the division of control
rights between entrepreneur and venture capitalists is often contingent on certain
measures of firm performance. If the indicator of the company’s performance (eg
earnings before taxes and interest) is low, the venture capital firm obtains full
control of the company. If company performance improves, the entrepreneur
retains or obtains more control rights. If company performance is very good, the
venture capitalist relinquishes most of his control rights. In this article, we extend
the incomplete contracting model of Aghion and Bolton to construct a theoretical
model that is consistent with these empirical findings.
Key words: incomplete contracts, financial contracting, contingent contracts,
control rights, joint ownership
JEL classification numbers: G324
Rahoitussopimukset ja kontingentit
päätösvaltaoikeudet




Pääomasijoitusrahoitusta käsittelevien empiiristen tutkimusten mukaan päätösval-
lan jako yrittäjän ja pääomasijoittajien välillä on usein ehdollinen yrityksen kan-
nattavuutta kuvaaville mittareille. Jos yrityksen kannattavuutta kuvaava signaali
(esimerkiksi yrityksen tuotot ennen veroja ja korkokuluja) on huono, pääoma-
sijoittaja saa tyypillisesti kaiken päätösvallan yrityksessä. Jos yrityksen kannatta-
vuus paranee, yrittäjä saa osan päätösvallasta. Jos yrityksen kannattavuus on erin-
omainen, pääomasijoittaja luopuu suurimmasta osasta päätösvaltaoikeuksiaan.
Tässä työssä laajennetaan Aghionin ja Boltonin epätäydellisten sopimusten teo-
riaan perustuvaa mallia ja rakennetaan teoreettinen malli, joka selittää nämä
empiiriset havainnot.
















In a stimulating paper, Kaplan and Strömberg (2000) examine in detail the
characteristics of financial contracts between firms and venture capitalists. In this
article, we present a model of the entrepreneur-investor relationship, which is
consistent with their following two key findings about the allocation of control
rights.
First, contrary to how control is typically specified in the theoretical literature,
it is usually not an indivisible right that can be held at any given time by only one
party. Rather, contracting parties typically agree on the division of many different
control rights, such as voting rights, board rights and liquidation rights that can be
adjusted through contingent provisions. Thus, in the real world, control is often
closer to a set of divisible variables than a single binary variable.
Second, different control rights are frequently contingent on observable
measures of the financial and non-financial performance of the firm. In particular,
control rights are often allocated in the following way. If the signal of the firm
performance (the firm’s earnings before taxes and interest, for example) is low,
the venture capital firm obtains full control of the firm. If the company
performance improves, the entrepreneur retains or obtains more control rights. If
the company performance is very good, the venture capitalist relinquishes most of
his control rights.
In this paper, we extend the incomplete contracting model of Aghion and
Bolton (1992) to build a model that, first, explains why control rights are often
contingent and, second, in which control rights are not completely indivisible.
There are some papers in which control rights are divisible and some in which
they are contingent. Aghion and Bolton (1992) is the best-known example of a
model of contingent but indivisible control rights. Kirilenko (2001) and Dessein
(2002), in turn, develop models of continuous but not contingent control rights.
However, except for this paper, none of these papers explains both of these
observations.
Obviously, attempting to develop a model of divisible and contingent control
rights is a demanding task. To simplify the problem, we approximate divisible and
contingent control rights by the following three-layered signal-contingent control
allocation, where control refers to the right to choose some interim action
affecting the profitability of an investment project. If the signal of the firm
performance is bad, the investor obtains full control of the firm. If the signal is
intermediate, the parties share control (joint control). If the signal is good, the
entrepreneur retains/obtains full control. In this article, we show that this three-
layered signal-contingent control allocation may dominate other control
allocations.8
As our model is a quite straightforward modification of Aghion and Bolton
(1992), we first briefly summarise their model. In their model, the entrepreneur
with no initial wealth and a wealthy investor contract over the financing of an
investment project, which yields two kinds of returns: monetary returns and non-
monetary, non-verifiable and non-transferable private returns for the entrepreneur.
The sizes of these returns depend on the realisation of the state of the world and
the interim action, which is taken after the state of the world has been realised.
1
Because of private benefits, the parties may have conflicting interests over which
action to take. This potential conflict cannot always be solved by ex-ante contracts
since, by assumption, contracts cannot be contingent on the action or the state of
the world. Then, it is critical which of the parties has the right to choose the
action. By assumption, contracts can be contingent on a publicly verifiable signal
of firm performance. The central result of Aghion and Bolton (1992) is that it may
be optimal to make the control allocation dependent on the signal in the following
way. If the realisation of the signal is bad, the investor obtains control and if the
realisation of the signal is good, the entrepreneur retains control. In what follows,
we refer to this allocation as a two-layered signal-contingent control allocation.
As summarised above, Aghion and Bolton (1992) is a model of all-or-nothing
shifts of control. In their model, either the entrepreneur or the investor holds all
control rights, and the party in control is changed if the realisation of the signal is
higher than some threshold level. However, as Kaplan and Strömberg (2000)
emphasize, changes in control right allocations are seldom so abrupt in reality.
Rather, the entrepreneur’s (investor’s) share of various control rights is often
continuously increasing (decreasing) in the performance of the firm. In this
article, we take a step towards explaining continuous and contingent control rights
by extending the two-layered signal-contingent control allocation model of
Aghion and Bolton into a model of three-layered signal-contingent control right
allocation and showing that this three-layered signal-contingent control allocation
can dominate other control allocations.
The other main contribution of this paper is to show that sharing the control
rights 50:50 can be a part of this optimal, three-layered signal-contingent control
allocation. This result contrasts with most of the literature, where joint control is
                                                
1 The state of the world can be interpreted, for example, as the original quality of the project or the
ability of the entrepreneur. The action can be interpreted, for example, as a choice between
defaulting or continuing, the choice of a new employee or the choice of how much to invest in
perks.9
typically never optimal
2 (see eg Hart 1995). The principal reason for the
nonoptimality is that under the standard definition of joint control, each party has
a right to veto the relationship into a standstill. In Aghion and Bolton (1992), for
example, the entrepreneur can always force the firm into a standstill and extract
the surplus in the contract renegotiation. Thus, the respective positions of the
entrepreneur and the investor are extremely asymmetric in their model. Joint
control, in effect, collapses into entrepreneur control with the entrepreneur
holding all control and cash flow rights.
In this article, we define joint control not as a right to force the firm into
standstill but as a right to force the firm into stochastic control. Under stochastic
control, the party in control is determined stochastically and the assets are always
in use. For simplicity, we assume that in case of disagreement each party obtains
control with a probability ½. A consequence of this assumption is that the
investor’s disagreement payoff in renegotiations is always positive. A
straightforward interpretation of the right to veto the firm into stochastic control is
that in case of disagreement the party in control is chosen by tossing a coin.
However, there are other arrangements that can implement the same outcome.
Consider, for example, a board of directors where the decision is made by the
majority rule, where the entrepreneur and the investor have an equal number of
votes (but somewhat less than 50 per cent) and where the rest of the votes are held
by a ‘non-partisan’ third party
3. If the entrepreneur and the investor disagree over
the decision, then the vote of the third party is decisive. Ex ante, the votes of the
third party may be regarded as stochastic.
One may wonder why the entrepreneur, who has all the bargaining power ex
ante and ex post in our model, would ever relinquish any control rights to the
investor? Similarly as in Aghion and Bolton (1992), our explanation is the
financing constraint. The entrepreneur control is not always feasible, as the
entrepreneur’s choice of action may not generate sufficient monetary returns (in
expected value) to satisfy the investor’s ex-ante participation constraint. In that
case, the entrepreneur has to relinquish some or all of his control rights to the
investor to induce her provide finance in the first place. Under investor control,
                                                
2 Joint control, though, is quite usual in practice. Among the best-known examples of joint control
are joint ventures, where parties typically share control rights 50:50. Other control structures,
which resemble joint control are partnerships and some venture capital financings. Partnerships
differ from joint ventures in that decisions are typically made by a majority rule, which means that
no fixed subset of the parties has a veto. Also some venture capital financings resemble joint
control, in that neither the founders of the firm nor the venture capitalists have full voting control.
In Kaplan’s and Strömberg’s (2000) data, the share of such financings was over 20 per cent.
3 In venture capital financings, for example, there are typically various types of board members
that are neither venture capitalists nor the insiders of the firm. The boards typically include, for
instance, academics, executives from other firms, retired executives, lawyers, consultants,
investment bankers, former managers of the firm, relatives etc. (Gompers and Lerner 1999, ch. 8).10
the entrepreneur relinquishes all control rights to the investor. Joint control and
signal-contingent control are more intermediate forms of control. In what follows
we study the feasibility and optimality properties of all of these alternatives, and
show that the optimal form of control crucially depends on the amount of needed
finance (or, equivalently, on the degree of the conflict of interest between the
parties).
Our main result is the following. If the cost of the project K is at an
‘intermediate’ level, the entrepreneur control contracts are not feasible, while
under mild conditions the three-layered signal-contingent control dominates other
forms of control. This result is consistent with the empirical findings of Kaplan
and Strömberg (2000). In addition, we show that the investor control is optimal
for a wider range of parameter values than as argued by Aghion and Bolton
(1992) (see also Vauhkonen 2002).
The intuition of the optimality of the three-layered signal-contingent control
allocation is the following. When the amount of the needed finance is sufficiently
large, entrepreneur control is not feasible. Full investor control, in turn, is
unattractive for the entrepreneur as the investor ignores the entrepreneur’s private
benefits when choosing the interim action. Under signal-contingent control
allocation, the expected
4 share of control rights allocated to each party lies
between these two extremes. This division of control rights provides both parties
some protection from the expropriation by the other party. It protects the investor,
as the entrepreneur cannot always choose his preferred action yielding high
private benefits but low monetary returns. Simultaneously, it protects the
entrepreneur from the investor always choosing an action that yields high
monetary returns but only low private benefits.
Besides being consistent with contingent and divisible control rights, our
model is consistent with the ‘pecking order theory of control’ (Aghion and Bolton
1992). If the size of the needed finance is small, the investor does not need much
protection against entrepreneurial expropriation. In that case, the entrepreneur can
retain all control rights. When the size of the needed finance is higher, the investor
needs some control rights to guarantee her sufficient return to her investment. In
that case, the three-layered signal-contingent control allocation is the optimal
mode of control. When the size of the needed finance is very high, the
entrepreneur must relinquish all control rights to the investor to induce her to
finance the project.
Besides articles mentioned above, this article is related to Aghion,
Dewatripont and Rey (1994) and Nöldeke and Schmidt (1995) who also consider
the consequences of assuming that the renegotiation point is not exogenously set
at (0, 0). Bolton and Scharfstein (1990), Diamond (1991), Hart and Moore (1994),
and Hart and Moore (1998) are similar to this paper in that they focus on how the
                                                
4 The actual division of control rights depends on the realisation of the signal.11
allocation of control rights affects the trade-off between cash flows and private
benefits. Another branch of related literature examines the optimal allocation of
control and cash flow rights in venture capital finance. Probably closest to this
paper are Chan, Siegel and Thakor (1990), Berglöf (1994), Hellmann (1998), who
study how the convertible securities allocate control rights to the right persons
(the entrepreneur and the venture capitalist) in different states of the world.
The outline of the paper is the following. In section 2, we present the model.
In section 3 we highlight our major results in a simple numerical example. In
sections 4–7 we examine the feasibility and optimality of different types of
contracts. In sections 4 and 5, we examine entrepreneur control and investor
control contracts, respectively. Joint control contracts are studied in section 6. In
section 7, we examine the signal-contingent contracts. We conclude in section 8.
2 The model
We extend the model of Aghion and Bolton (1992) in two ways. First, to examine
the optimality properties of the three-layered signal-contingent control allocation,
we extend their model with two actions, two signals and two states of nature into a
model with three actions, three signals and three states of nature. Second, we
model joint control differently. Otherwise, the models are identical.
Consider a risk-neutral entrepreneur who has an opportunity to undertake an
investment project but lacks funds to finance it. The funds for the investment, K,
must come from a risk-neutral wealthy investor. There is a competitive market for
finance. Thus, the entrepreneur reaps all the surplus of the project by making a
take-it-or-leave-it offer to the investor. The investor, in turn, accepts the offered
contract only if her expected monetary payoff is at least K.
The time structure of the model is the following.




the state of nature
 and signal s
Renegotiation Action a Monetary returns
r, private benefits
The contract determines how the cash flow rights and the control rights of the
project are divided between the entrepreneur and the investor. Cash flow rights
determine how the monetary returns of the project, r(a;), are divided between a
non-negative transfer to the entrepreneur, r(s,r(a;)), and the residual allocated to
the investor, r(a;)–t(s,r(a;)). Monetary returns depend on the realisation of the12
state nature  and the interim action a. The transfer t(s,r() can be directly
contingent of s and r only but not of a or , because contracts are incomplete.
Control rights refer to the right to choose the interim action a. Under
unilateral forms of control (entrepreneur and investor control), the party in control
has an exclusive right to choose the interim action. Under signal-contingent
control, the party in control depends on the realisation of the signal. Under joint
control, the action must be chosen unanimously.
This article provides a novel interpretation of joint control.
Assumption 1. Under joint control, the entrepreneur first proposes some action.
Then, the investor either accepts or rejects the proposed action. If the parties fail
to reach an agreement, then the entrepreneur obtains control with a probability ½
and the investor with a probability ½.
According to the standard definition of joint control, each party has a right to
force the firm into a standstill in case of disagreement. As discussed in the
Introduction, this assumption together with the assumption that the entrepreneur
has all the bargaining power in renegotiations imply that joint control, in effect,
collapses into entrepreneur control. We depart from the literature by assuming that
each party has a right to force the firm into stochastic control. Under stochastic
control each party obtains control with some given probability. For simplicity, we
set this probability at ½.
Besides observable and verifiable monetary returns, the project yields some
non-transferable, non-verifiable and non-monetary private benefits l(a;) for the
entrepreneur. Although private benefits are non-monetary, we assume that they
can be measured in monetary terms. Examples of private benefits are personal
satisfaction of running the project, reputation, the entrepreneur’s desire to keep
the family business in operation although it may not be very profitable, and so on.
The fact that only the entrepreneur enjoys these private benefits creates a
potential conflict of interests between the parties over the choice of action. The
conflict of interests arises because the investor is only interested in cash flows,
whereas the entrepreneur is interested in both cash flows and private benefits. The
potential conflict of interests can be easily seen by comparing the parties’ von
Neumann – Morgenstern utility functions UE(a;s,) and UI(a;s,). It is assumed
that the utility functions are linear and take the following form:
          ; a l ; a r , s t E , s ; a UE (2.1)
           ; a r , s t ; a r E , s ; a UI (2.2)13
It is obvious that in some state of nature  and for some arbitrary transfer schedule
t(s,r(a;) the action that maximises the entrepreneur’s utility UE() may differ from
the action that maximises the investor’s utility UI(). Therefore, it matters who has
the right to choose the action. In fact, the disagreement over the action choice can
be so severe that the entrepreneur’s preferred action schedule
5 may not
compensate (in expected value) the investor her initial investment K even if she
has all the cash flow rights (ie, if t() = 0). That is, for some parameter values,
E(r(aE(),))  <  K. In that case, the feasibility of financing requires that the
entrepreneur relinquishes at least some control rights to the investor to ensure that
her participation constraint is satisfied.
Contracts are incomplete in two ways. First, the realisation of the state of
nature is unverifiable for third parties. Therefore, contracts cannot be contingent
on . The entrepreneur and the investor, however, observe the realisation of  ex-
post. This provides a rationale for the ex-post renegotiation. The variable  can be
interpreted, for example, as the quality of the project. As the project goes on, both
parties are likely to learn this quality. Although observable ex post, the quality
may not be easily measurable and describable. Therefore, it may be impossible to
write contracts that are contingent on it. However, it may be possible to write a
contract that is contingent on some publicly verifiable signal s, which correlates
with  . For example, firm’s short-term profits are likely to correlate with the
quality of the project. If the correlation between the signal and the state is
sufficiently high, it may be useful to design contracts that are contingent on
signals. Second, the action is too complex or too difficult to describe in the
contract. As a consequence, contracts cannot be contingent on actions.
After the realisation of , the initial contract can be renegotiated. As typical in
incomplete contracting environments, renegotiation may be socially useful and
actually take place in equilibrium (see, for example, Salanie 1997). We assume
that the entrepreneur has all the bargaining power in renegotiations.
6 Thus, the
entrepreneur can make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the investor after  has been
realized. In renegotiations, the entrepreneur proposes a new monetary transfer
schedules for the investor. If the investor accepts the new contract, the old
contract is torn up. Obviously, the investor accepts the new contract if and only if
her payoff is at least as high as under the old contract.
In Aghion and Bolton (1992), there are only two states of nature, two actions
in the action set and two possible outcomes of the signal. Their model is designed
to examine the optimality of ‘all-or-nothing’ shifts of control. However, to study
smoother shifts in control right allocations we need a larger number or a
                                                
5 The entrepreneur’s preferred action in state  for a given transfer schedule t(s,r()) is given by
aE(s,) = arg 
a
max {E[t(s,r(a;))+l(a;)]}.
6 Our main results remain valid even if this assumption is relaxed. See the arguments in Aghion
and Bolton (1992, p. 479, ftn. 7).14
continuum of possible states and signals. We examine the simplest extension with
three actions, three states, and three signals. Thus, we assume that the sets of








The first-best action a*(
i) in state 
i, i  =  g,  m,  b, maximises the sum of
monetary returns and private benefits. In other words







    
 , i, j = g, m, b. This formulation shows that
the first-best action may be different in different states of the world. We assume
that the parameters of the model are such that ag = a*(
g) is the first-best action in
state 
g, am = a*(
m) in state 
m, and that ab = a*(
b) in state 
b.
The signals are imperfectly correlated with the states of the world. Denote
  ). b , m , g k , i ( s s ob Pr
i k i k        (2.3)
We assume that the signals satisfy:
2 / 1 , ,
b b m m g g     (2.4)
We also assume that the project return r    {0,1}. Given this set of return
realisations, the expected monetary return of the project can be expressed as
follows.
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Without loss of generality, we assume that each state of nature 
i takes place with
an equal probability 1/3. Thus, if the first-best action is chosen in each state of the






g   . In what follows, we
denote this return as the first-best monetary payoff.
Private benefits in different states and with different actions are denoted in the
same way as the monetary returns. In other words, the level of private benefits in
state 
i when the action is aj is denoted by 
i
j l.
There is a conflict of interests between the investor and the entrepreneur only
if the same action does not maximise both monetary returns and private benefits
in a given state of nature. The next assumption guarantees that the potential
conflict of interests is as stark as possible.
Assumption 2.  Private benefits 
i
j l  and expected monetary returns 
i
j y  satisfy












g   15
According to (i), in each state of nature, action ag yields more private benefits than
action am, which, in turn, yields more private benefits than action ab. According to
(ii), in each states of nature, action ab yields more monetary returns than action am,
which, in turn, yields more monetary returns than action ag.
In the next section, we highlight our main results in a simple numerical
example. In subsequent sections, we generalise the insights of that example.
3 Numerical example
For a moment, assume that the initial contract allocates all the monetary returns to
the investor and that the initial contract can be contingent on the state of the
world. In later sections, these assumptions are relaxed.
Suppose that the monetary returns 
i
j y  and the private benefits 
i
j l o f  a n





g  150 y
g




g private benefit 150 l
g
g  80 l
g
m  0 l
g
b 
total surplus 250 230 200
return 0 y
m
g  60 y
m




m private benefit 90 l
m
g  50 l
m
m  0 l
m
b 
total surplus 90 110 90
return 0 y
b
g  30 y
b




b private benefit 30 l
b
g  20 l
b
m  0 l
b
b 
total surplus 30 50 60
Now, consider the entrepreneur’s maximisation problem. The entrepreneur, who
has all the bargaining power, allocates the control rights with the aim of
maximising his expected payoffs while satisfying the investor’s participation
constraint. We show below that the way the entrepreneur allocates the control
rights depends on the cost of the project, K (or, equivalently, on the severity of the
conflict of interests between the parties).
For a moment, assume that the renegotiation is not possible. Suppose first that






g     or K  100/3. In this case, the entrepreneur control is
feasible and implements the first-best action schedule. To see this, consider the
entrepreneur’s problem of maximising his private benefits. The action that16
maximises the private benefit is ag in all three states of nature. When the
entrepreneur chooses ag in all three states, the investor’s expected monetary return






g   .
7 However, note that renegotiation will actually take place
in states 
m and 
b. In state 
m, the entrepreneur offers to choose the first-best




m    from the investor. Similarly, in
state 
b the entrepreneur offers to choose the first-best action ab in exchange for a




b   . Thus, whenever feasible, the entrepreneur control
implements the first-best action schedule. The entrepreneur control is feasible







(which are equal to her post-renegotiation returns as the entrepreneur has all the
bargaining power) are at least as large as K.






g    , when entrepreneur
control is not feasible. In that case the entrepreneur must relinquish some or all of
the control rights to the investor to guarantee that her participation constraint is












g        or
3 / 220 K 3 / 100   . For these values of K, the following three-layered state-
contingent control allocation is feasible and implements the first-best action
schedule. If the realisation of the state is 
g, the entrepreneur retains control. If the
realisation of the state is 
m, the parties share control. If the realisation of the state
is 
b, the investor obtains control.
8
To see this, consider which actions are implemented in each state. As shown
above, entrepreneur control implements the first-best action ag in state 
g. It is also
easy to see that investor control implements the first-best action ab in state 
b,
since the investor always chooses the action that maximises her monetary payoffs.
What is less obvious is that joint control implements the first-best action am in
state 
m. To see this, suppose that the entrepreneur proposes that the action am is
taken. If the investor agrees, then the investor’s and the entrepreneur’s payoffs are
m
m y  and 
m
m l , respectively. If the investor disagrees, then, by Assumption 1, she
forces the firm into stochastic control. Under stochastic control, the entrepreneur
chooses his preferred action ag with probability ½ and the investor her preferred
action ab with probability ½. In that case, the investor’s and the entrepreneur’s








g  , respectively.
                                                
7 Since the entrepreneur has all the bargaining power, the investor makes an initial lump-sum












g    is strictly bigger
than K.
8 Of course, it would be possible to set the numerical values of our example in such a way that the
optimal state-contingent control allocation would be different. For example, it is easy to think of
real world cases, where the investor control would be optimal in the good state of the world and
the entrepreneur control in the bad state of the world.17
Now, it is easy to see that joint control implements the first-best action am in
state 
m as the parameters in the example satisfy















To summarise, the state-contingent control allocation where the entrepreneur
obtains control in the good state of the world, both (joint control) in the medium
state of the world and the investor in the bad state of the world directly




Given these choices of actions, the investor’s expected monetary payoff under the






g   . Thus, when












g        or when  3 / 220 K 3 / 100    the
state-contingent control allocation is feasible and implements the first-best action
schedule whereas entrepreneur control is not feasible. In what follows we also
show that under mild conditions, the three-layered state-contingent control
dominates other forms of control for intermediate values of K.
For very high values of K, only the investor control contracts that allocate
control to the investor in all states of the world are feasible. When K is close to






b    or 350/3, the entrepreneur obtains finance only by
relinquishing all the cash flow and control rights to the investor.
In what follows, we generalise the numerical example in two ways. First, we
assume that state-contingent contracts are not possible because of contractual
incompleteness. However, we show that signal-contingent contracts approximate
state-contingent contracts if the signals are sufficiently well correlated with he
states of the world. Second, we assume that the entrepreneur is interested not only
in private benefits but also in monetary returns.
In the subsequent sections, we examine under which conditions entrepreneur
control, investor control, and joint control are feasible. We then derive the
conditions under which the three-layered signal-contingent control allocation
dominates these other control allocations.18
4 Entrepreneur control
This section is a straigtforward extension of the section III.A of Aghion and
Bolton (1992) into a three-action, three-signal and three-state case.
Under entrepreneur control, the entrepreneur has the right to decide which
action to choose at date 3. In this section we show that, whenever feasible,
entrepreneur control implements the first-best plan of actions. Unfortunately, as
shown below, some socially profitable projects cannot be implemented under
entrepreneur control.
The entrepreneur’s problem at date 0 is to design a transfer schedule t(s,r)
such that the investor, anticipating the future actions and the outcomes of the
possible future renegotiations, is willing to provide the funds at date 0. Without
loss of generality we can concentrate on the affine transfer schedules of the form
9
t(s,r) = t
sr, where 0  t
s  1 for s = g, m, b.
Thus, the variable t
s denotes the entrepreneur’s share of the final monetary
returns, which depends on the realisation of the signal s.
Let us examine when the entrepreneur control is feasible and when it
implements the first-best action plan. As shown in our example, the initial
contract may implement the first-best actions either directly or indirectly through
renegotiation. Recall that in our example where t
s = 0 for all s, the entrepreneur’s
preferred action was ag in all three possible states of the world. In consequence,
the first-best action ag was directly implemented in state 
g. In fact, the
entrepreneur control directly implements the first-best action ag in state 
g for all
admissible transfer schedules.
Proposition 1. Under entrepreneur control, any transfer t
s, 0   t
s  1,  directly
implements the first-best action ag in state 
g.
Proof. For a given t
s, the entrepreneur strictly prefers action ag to actions am and


























g l y , l y max l y      and by assumption 2(i), the above inequality is
satisfied for all t
s, 0  t
s  1. QED
                                                
9 As shown by Aghion and Bolton (1992 p. 480, p. 482), this simplification is possible since the
final returns can take only two values (0 or 1) and since in some states of the world the action plan
that maximises the total surplus (y + l) is not the same as the action plan that maximises the private
benefits.19
In contrast to state 
g, all transfers t
s, 0  t
s  1, do not directly implement the
first-best actions in states 
m and 
b. To see this, consider the entrepreneur’s
problem of choosing the action in state 




b). When the realisation of the signal is s, the entrepreneur’s preferred
action in state 
i is given by










   
 (4.1)
It is easy to see that when the realisation of t
s is close to zero, the entrepreneur
prefers the inefficient action ag, which provides him high private benefits, to the
efficient action 
m or 
b. In that case, the first-best action is implemented only if
the investor bribes the entrepreneur to choose the efficient action in contract
renegotiations.
For illustration, suppose that in state 
m (a similar analysis applies to state 
b),
the realisation of t
s is so low that the entrepreneur prefers the action ag. Thus, the





s l y t   and
m
g
s y ) t 1 (  , respectively. In renegotiations the investor bribes the entrepreneur to
choose the first-best action am. As the entrepreneur has all the bargaining power in






m y ) t 1 ( l y     and 
m
g
s y ) t 1 (  , respectively. Analogously, we can show that
in state 
b the first-best action ab is implemented in renegotiations in a similar
fashion. Therefore, whenever feasible, the entrepreneur control always
implements the first-best action schedule.
Unfortunately, as illustrated in our example, some efficient projects are not
feasible under entrepreneur control since the entrepreneur cannot always
guarantee the investor sufficient payoffs to satisfy her ex-ante participation
constraint. The general result is presented in Proposition 1 below. Before stating
the proposition, we first introduce some definitions.




the entrepreneur to choose the first-best action in all states of the world for all
possible signal realisations, that is, if the transfer schedule is such that
aE(s,
i) = a*(s,
i) for all s and i.








Contracts are partial renegotiation contracts, if the initial contract is
renegotiated in at least one of the states 
m and 
b with at least one of the signal
realisations but not in both of the states with all signal realisations. Thus, partial
renegotiation contracts include all contracts that are neither renegotiation-proof
contracts nor full renegotiation contracts.20
We also introduce the following auxiliary definitions:
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(4.5)
where rp, fr, and pr denote the entrepreneur’s highest feasible monetary payoffs
with renegotiation-proof, full renegotiation, and partial renegotiation contracts,
respectively.
Proposition 2.  Entrepreneur control is feasible and implements the first-best
action plan if and only if max(rp, fr, pr)  K. If K belongs to the non-empty






g   entrepreneur control is not
feasible.
Proof. See Appendix.
For illustration of this result, let us insert the numerical values of our example into









































bb converge to one, pr converges to 202/3. Thus, when
signals are very informative, partial renegotiation contracts are feasible for higher
values of K than renegotiation-proof or full-renegotiation contracts. However,21
even the partial-renegotiation contracts fail to implement the first-best action
schedule when K is sufficiently close to the first-best monetary return 220/3.
The result that the partial-renegotiation contracts dominate full-renegotiation
contracts for some values of K is somewhat surprising as the full renegotiation
contracts allocate all the cash flow rights to the investor. The reason for this
surprising result is that as the entrepreneur has all the bargaining power in the
renegotiation phase he may extract too high a surplus when there is maximum
renegotiation (for details, see Aghion and Bolton 1992, p. 483).
To summarise this section, all efficient projects are not feasible under
entrepreneur control, since the entrepreneur must get a sufficient share of the
monetary returns of the project (either directly or indirectly through renegotiation)
to choose the first-best action schedule. For high values of K, this requirement is
in conflict with the investor’s participation constraint.
5 Investor control
In this section we study the feasibility of investor control contracts. We show that
investor control contracts dominate entrepreneur control contracts for intermediate
values of K. More specifically, we show that the investor control contracts
implement the first-best action schedule even when






g pr fr rp       , that is, in the range of K where
entrepreneur contracts are not feasible.
Let us start our analysis of investor control contracts by examining which
transfers induce the investor to choose the first-best action in each state of nature.
Note first that for any transfer t
s, 0  t
s < 1, the investor’s preferred action is ab in







I a ) y ) t 1 (( max arg ) , s ( a
j
   
  for all i and t
s, 0  t
s < 1. The next proposition
directly follows from that observation.
Proposition 3. Given any t
s, 0  t
s < 1, investor control directly implements the




m, however, the investor’s preferred action ab differs from the
first-best actions ag and am. Thus, in those states the first-best actions ag and am are
implemented only if the entrepreneur offers to renegotiate his share of the
monetary returns to bribe the investor to choose the first-best action.
On the basis of the renegotiation process, the investor control contracts can be
divided into two categories: full-renegotiation contracts and partial renegotiation
contracts.22
Full renegotiation contracts
Full renegotiation contracts are always renegotiated in states 
g and 
m and
implement the first-best actions with all realisations of the signal. First, consider
the entrepreneur’s problem of inducing the investor to choose the first-best action
ag in state 
g. The investor chooses ag only if the entrepreneur offers to lower his
initial share of the monetary returns from t
s to 
s t ˆ , such that





s    (5.1)
By setting  0 t ˆs  , we get the lowest initial transfer t
s that satisfies this inequality.
Denote that transfer by 
g
fr t.






fr   (5.2)
which, by assumption 2, is bigger than zero.
Analogously, the lowest initial transfer 
m
fr t  that induces the investor to choose
the first-best action am in state 
m is






fr   (5.3)
which, by assumption 2, is also bigger than zero.
Let us combine (5.2) and (5.3) to find the lowest transfer 
I
fr t  that induces the
investor to choose the first-best action in all states of the world and for all signal
realisations:







Now, the investor’s highest expected payoff under full-renegotiation investor
control contracts is










fr      (5.5)
Thus, the full-renegotiation investor control contracts are feasible if and only if
K
I








fr    , full-
renegotiation investor control contracts are not feasible. In the numerical example,
3 / 125
I
fr   . If    3 / 220 , 3 / 125 K , full renegotiation contracts are not feasible
and do not implement the first-best action schedule.23
Aghion and Bolton (1992) limit their analysis of the investor control contracts
to full-renegotiation contracts. Therefore, they conclude that investor control is
feasible only if  K
I
fr   . However, as shown by Vauhkonen (2002), their
reasoning is not valid, as they overlook the partial-renegotiation investor control
contracts.
Next, we show that partial renegotiation investor control contracts implement






g    , and, thus, strictly
dominate the entrepreneur control contracts for some intermediate values of K.
Partial renegotiation contracts
As mentioned above, partial renegotiation investor control contracts are such
contracts that are renegotiated in at least one of the states 
g and 
m for at least
one of the signal realisations but not in both of the states for all signal realisations.
In the next proposition we show that if the signals are sufficiently well
correlated with the states of nature, then the investor’s expected payoff can
converge to the first-best monetary payoff under investor control contracts.
Proposition 4.  When  
gg,  
mm, and 
bb converge to 1 and when the transfer




fr  the investor’s expected monetary payoff 
I
pr π  converges to






g   .
Proof. By design, 
g
fr t  is defined as the entrepreneur’s initial share of the monetary
returns that he offers to cut to zero to bribe the investor to choose the first-best
action ag in state 
g. The transfer 
m
fr t  is designed analogously in state 
m. In state

g, the investor chooses the first-best action ab with any transfer 0  t
s < 1. This





b m g   and when 
gg, 
mm and 
bb converge to 1,








g y , y  and 
b
b y . This, in turn, implies that the investor’s
expected total monetary payoff converges to the first-best monetary payoff






g   . QED











fr t t t   , the expression for the investor’s expected
payoff 
I
pr   can be written as24
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(5.6)
We immediately see that when 
gg, 
mm and 
bb converge to 1, 
I
fr   converges to






g   .
To summarise this section, we showed that investor control contracts
dominate the entrepreneur control contracts when  , ) , , (max( K pr fr rp    






g   . The reason is that the investor’s preferred action plan yields
higher expected monetary returns than the entrepreneur’s preferred action plan.
That allows the financing of some high-cost projects, which are not feasible under
entrepreneur control.
6 Joint control
Under joint control, the parties must take a unanimous choice of action. In this
section, we show, first, that a renegotiation-proof joint control contract that
allocates all monetary returns to the investor implements the first-best action in
state 
m under mild conditions. This is an important auxiliary result, which is
utilised in section 7. Second, we show that joint control contracts never strictly
dominate all other control allocations.
We consider two kinds of joint control contracts. Under renegotiation-proof
contracts the initial transfer schedule directly induces a unanimous choice of
action. The second possibility is that parties reach agreement in the renegotiation.
Before examining these contracts, we need to examine what happens under joint
control if the parties disagree over the choice of action.
If the parties disagree over the choice of action and if the renegotiations fail,
then, by Assumption 1, each party obtains control with a probability ½. The party
in control then chooses his or her most preferred action. As shown in section 5,
the investor’s preferred action in any state of the world for any realisation of the
transfer t
s, 0  t
s < 1 is ab. The entrepreneur’s preferred action in state 
i for some
t










 . These action choices in
combination with the initial transfer schedule  ) t , t , t (
b m g  determine the parties’
disagreement payoffs, which are the starting points of the possible future
renegotiations.
Consider first the parties’ disagreement payoffs in state 
m. The
entrepreneur’s disagreement action is am if 
m
rp
s t t   and ag if 
m
rp
s t t  , where 
m
rp t i s
defined in (4.2). Thus, the investor’s expected disagreement payoff25
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s t t  . Note, in particular, that when  0 t
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This result is utilised in the next proposition, which shows that joint control
contract with t
s = 0 for all s directly implements the first-best action am in state 
m
under mild conditions.






m    and






m   , the transfer schedule (t
g, t
m, t
b) = (0,0,0) directly implements
the first-best action am in state 
m.
Proof. Suppose first that the investor and the entrepreneur unanimously agree that
action am is taken. In that case, given that (t
g, t
m, t





m l , respectively. Suppose, alternatively, that the parties disagree over the
choice of action. Then, given that (t
g, t
m, t
b) = (0,0,0) and by Assumption 1, their








g  , respectively. Thus, the
first-best action am in state 
m is chosen unanimously when the parameters of the












m   . QED
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m    hold simultaneously is rather mild, since, by the definition of
the first-best action, at least one of these inequalities always holds.
In the next proposition we show that joint control is not feasible when K is
sufficiently high. The Proposition directly follows from the following Lemma.







































Proof. The entrepreneur proposes that action ab is taken in state 
b only if t
s is
such that
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s t t  , ab is always implemented. If 
b
rp
s t t  , the parties disagree over
the choice of action. In that case, ab is implemented only with probability ½.
Proposition 6. There are values of K such that joint control contracts do not
implement the first-best plan of actions and, thus, are dominated by investor
control contracts.
Proof. By Lemma 1, joint control implements the first-best action ab in state 
b
only if the entrepreneur obtains a positive share of the monetary returns.
Therefore, the investor’s largest expected monetary payoffs under joint control are






g   .
Thus, there are values of K close to the first-best expected monetary payoff such
that joint control contracts are not feasible. The investor control contracts, in turn,






g    .
Therefore, investor control contracts strictly dominate joint control contracts for






g   . QED
By Propositions 4 and 6, joint control never strictly dominates other forms of
control in our model. This is a standard result in the literature (see Hart 1995). In
the next section we show, however, that joint control can be a part of the optimal
signal-contingent control allocation.
7 Signal-contingent control
The control allocations examined in previous sections are not contingent on
realisations of s. In this section, we examine signal-contingent control allocations,
where the party in control depends on the realisation of s.
By Propositions 1, 3 and 5, an obvious candidate for efficiency is a control
allocation rule, which allocates control to the entrepreneur when s  =  g, to the
investor when s = b and to both (joint control) when s = m. The next Proposition
is a straightforward corollary of Propositions 1, 3, and 5.






m    and






m   , the investor’s expected payoff converges to the first-best




b)  =  (0,0,0) allocates control to the entrepreneur when s  =  g, to the
investor when s = b and to both when s = m.27
Proof. By propositions 1, 3 and 5, the above control allocation directly
implements the first-best actions in each state of the world when the signals
correspond to the state. Therefore, when (t
g, t
m, t




bb converge to 1, the investor’s expected monetary payoff converges to the
first-best monetary payoff. QED
For illustration, note that the investor’s expected payoff S with the signal-
contingent contract specified in Proposition 7 is
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 
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bb converge to 1, S converges to the first-best monetary payoffs
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By Propositions 2 and 6, neither entrepreneur nor joint control is feasible for
when K is sufficiently close to the first-best monetary return. Therefore, signal-
contingent control dominates entrepreneur control and joint control when K is






g   . This argument, however, is not adequate
to establish that signal-contingent control dominates investor control as, by
Proposition 4, 
I
pr   also converges to the first-best monetary payoff. However, it
can be shown that there exist parameter values such that the difference 
I
pr S     is
positive. When  0
I
pr S     , then for some parameter values signal-contingent
control strictly dominates investor control. By combining these findings, we can
establish the main result of our paper.
Proposition 8. There are values of K such that (i) entrepreneur and joint control
are not feasible and (ii) signal-contingent control dominates investor control.
Proof. See above.
We interpret the signal-contingent control allocation examined above as a control
allocation associated with many venture capital financings. The benefit of the
signal-contingent control allocation is close to the benefit of debt in Aghion and
Bolton (1992). When the size of the needed finance is sufficiently high, the
entrepreneur must relinquish some control rights to the investor to obtain finance.
The signal-contingent control allocation allows the entrepreneur to keep some28
control rights and to reap some private benefits while allowing adequate
protection to the investor.
8 Conclusions
The principal objective of this paper was to try to explain the smooth shifts in
control observed by Kaplan and Strömberg (2000). In an incomplete contracting
environment, we used a signal-contingent contract as a proxy of the smooth
control contracts and showed that such a signal-contingent contract may dominate
other control allocations under mild parameter restrictions. On the basis of this
result, we regard that our model is consistent with the key empirical findings of
Kaplan and Strömberg (2000).
The reader may wonder how such signal-contingent control allocation can be
implemented by using standard financial securities. As discussed in Kaplan and
Strömberg (2000), in real world venture capital financings there are many
combinations of preferred equity, convertible securities, and multiple classes of
common stock that implement any desired control allocation. One simple
possibility is that the entrepreneur finances the project by issuing multiple classes
of common stock. Initially the investor has all the control rights. Then, if the
signal of the firm performance is intermediate some of the investor’s equity with
superior control rights converts into common stock such that the parties share the
voting rights. If the signal is good, most or all of the investor’s equity with
superior control rights converts into common stock such that the entrepreneur
obtains voting control.
We regard our model as a first step towards explaining continuous, contingent
and divisible control rights. In this area, much remains to be explored in future
studies. Another direction worth pursuing might be to try to build venture capital-
specific models that are more consistent with the empirical findings of Kaplan and
Strömberg (2000) than the existing venture capital-specific models (see Kaplan
and Strömberg 2000, p. 30–32). Our general model lacks many features that are
prevalent in the theoretical literature of venture capital financings, such as both
parties’ effort choices. Ideally, one would want to incorporate such venture capital
specific characteristics into the theoretical models, which attempt to explain
empirical observations from venture capital contracts.29
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1.
Note that this proposition and its proof are very similar to the Proposition 2 of
Aghion and Bolton (1992) and its proof. The minor differences between the two
propositions stem from the fact that our model studies the case with three actions,
three signals and three states whereas Aghion and Bolton (1992) study the case
with two-action, two-signal, and two-state case.
We consider one-by-one the feasibility conditions of the three different types
of entrepreneur control contracts: renegotiation-proof contracts, full renegotiation
contracts and partial renegotiation contracts. Recall that contracts are feasible if
the investor’s expected monetary payoffs are at least as high as the cost of
investment K. To study the feasibility, we derive below the investor’s highest
possible expected monetary payoffs under different types of contracts.
Renegotiation-proof contracts:
First, we must derive the conditions when the contracts are renegotiation-proof.




high to induce the entrepreneur to choose the first-best action in all states of the
world for all possible signal realisations. Consider state-by-state which transfers
induce the entrepreneur to choose the first-best actions.
First, consider the state 
g. By proposition 1, all t
s, 0   t
s  1,  directly
implement the first-best action ag in state 
g.
Next, consider the state 
m. The entrepreneur control directly implements the
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where 
m
rp t  is defined as the lowest t that directly induces the entrepreneur to
choose the first-best action am in state m.
Finally, consider the state 
b. The analysis is similar as in state 
m. Thus, the







































rp t  is defined in a similar fashion as 
m
rp t.
Combining the results, we see that contracts are renegotiation-proof, if and
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Thus, 
E
rp t  is the lowest transfer that induces the entrepreneur to choose directly the
first-best action in all states of the world. Therefore, the investor’s highest
possible expected payoff with the renegotiation-proof entrepreneur control
contracts is









rp rp      ,( v )
and, thus, the renegotiation-proof contracts are feasible if and only if rp  K.
Full renegotiation contracts
This is the case we studied in our numerical example. We define full renegotiation
contracts as the contracts which are always renegotiated in states 
m and 
b.
Among these contracts, the investor’s expected payoffs are maximised when t
s = 0
for all s. Given this transfer schedule, the entrepreneur’s preferred action is ag in
all states of the world. Thus, the investor’s pre-renegotiation expected return
(which is the same as the post-renegotiation expected return) is







g fr     .
Thus, the full-renegotiation contracts are feasible if and only if fr  K.
Partial-renegotiation contracts
With partial renegotiation contracts, transfers are defined in such a way that the
initial contract is renegotiated in some states of the world for some signal31
realisations. Thus, the family of partial renegotiation contracts consists of all
contracts that are neither renegotiation-proof or full renegotiation contracts.
The transfer schedule that maximises the investor’s expected monetary
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the investor’s expected monetary payoffs pr can be written
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(vi)
Thus, the partial renegotiation contracts are feasible if and only if pr  K.
Combining the above results, we see that entrepreneur control contracts are
feasible if and only if (rp, fr, pr)  K. QED32
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